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The 1994 Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) set new rules for 
trade in agricultural products and initiated a modest reduction in protection (Anania 
et.al.). However, agriculture is still facing significant trade restrictions and there is much 
to be done to future liberalize trade in this industry. The current (Doha) round of the 
WTO was launched in 2001, and so far has made little or no progress in moving towards 
freer trade in agriculture. The massive subsidies and trade barriers in OECD countries 
undercut the fledgling agricultural sectors in developing countries and helps keep poor 
countries poor. For example, the 2002 US Farm Bill increased, rather than decreased, 
agricultural subsidies in the United States. This is all very discouraging.  
One of the major accomplishments of the URAA was the replacement of 
quantitative restrictions and other non-tariff barriers (NTBs) with tariffs – the so called 
tariffication. To prevent “dirty” tariffication (i.e., the conversion of NTBs to extremely 
high tariffs) and to improve market access, tariff rate quotas (TRQs) were introduced as 
part of the URAA. TRQs were set up in order to establish minimum market access 
opportunities where there had previously been no significant imports, or to maintain 
access opportunities where tariffication would otherwise have reduced market access. But 
have these TRQs moved the globe closer to or further from freer trade in agricultural 
products?  
TRQs are two-tiered tariffs, with a limited volume of imports (i.e., the quota) 
imported at a lower tariff rate, and with all additional “above-quota” imports subject to a 
higher tariff (Skully). A TRQ displays both tariff-like and quota-like characteristics.   2
Under TRQs, the import quantity is not limited and over-quota imports are permitted as 
long as the importer is willing to pay the higher tariff.  
The introduction of TRQs as a result of the URAA, ensures one thing – that 
agricultural trade policies continue to be very complex. TRQs have a number of 
undesirable features (Anderson). For instance, they generate quota rents, legitimize a role 
for state trading agencies, and introduce an opportunity for importers to blatantly 
discriminate among exporting countries. Hence, from the theoretical point of view, it is 
unclear if the introduction of TRQs truly improves economic welfare.  
In practice, TRQs have been broadly adopted in agricultural trade since the 
URAA. The number of TRQs has been rising and 1,475 TRQs were reported to the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) by forty-three members in 2002. For example, U.S. 
dairy, peanuts, and beef NTBs were converted to TRQs. Japan introduced TRQs for rice 
imports, and the European Union (EU) did the same for dairy products.  
Did the implementation of TRQs really improve market access as promised? We 
try to address this question in this paper. Based on summary statistics, the performance of 
agricultural TRQs seems unsatisfactory. The average yearly TRQ fill rate, a ratio of 
actual annual imports to the notified import quantities, was only slightly higher than 60% 
from 1995 to 2000. In addition, there was a slight declining trend in TRQ fill rates over 
this five year period. The average fill rates of OECD TRQs fell from 67% in 1995 to 57% 
in 1999 (OECD, 2001). These relatively low average fill rates reveal that agricultural 
TRQs are under-utilized by a significant margin.  
Several proposals for further liberalizing agricultural TRQs have been brought to 
the WTO in the Doha round, but unsurprisingly no consensus has been reached. The   3
debate on liberalizing TRQs continues. The most effective way to further reform 
agricultural TRQs is to change those factors that reduce TRQ fill rates the most. 
Therefore, a better understanding of the effects of TRQs on market access is needed. 
Trade theory provides several possible explanations for the poor performance of 
TRQs. First, the domestic demand for imports may be insufficient to fill the quota. 
Second, the in-quota and over-quota tariffs may simply be too high and therefore block 
imports. Third, TRQ administrative methods could easily undermine market access. TRQ 
administration is a rationing problem and allocates import rights, influencing both 
absolute import volume and trade shares. Some administrative methods can increase 
transactions costs and lead to lower fill rates. 
A set of invited papers published in the April 2000 issue (Vol. 29, No. 1) of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics Review described the implementation of 
agricultural TRQs in the EU, the United States, Canada, Japan, Korea, and developing 
countries. Some of these papers identified factors impeding market access under TRQs 
and singled out ideas for further reform of TRQs. For example, in the Philippines, a 
reduction of the above-quota tariff on pork would lead to larger imports of this 
commodity (Abbott and Paarlberg). Maximum trade liberalization benefits in developing 
countries would most likely come from tariff reductions rather than from quota expansion 
(Abbott and Morse). Alternatively, in the EU increasing quota volumes would likely 
result in greater welfare gains than would tariff reductions (Bureau and Tangermann).  
We believe that there is a lack of knowledge on the impacts of TRQ 
implementation practices on market access. Previous studies either theoretically analyzed 
the potential reasons why TRQs have failed to fully reach their stated goals, or they   4
conducted individual case studies that are primarily country and commodity specific. No 
comprehensive empirical study, except Monnich (2003), has attempted to untangle an 
explanation of fill rates. However, Monnich only examined TRQs in the EU that account 
for less than 7% of total agricultural TRQs. Moreover, we believe there were problems 
with her model specification. In order to fill a gap in the literature, we conduct a 
systematic study of the implementation of agricultural TRQs. Our analysis is conducted 
at a disaggregate level and we include in our dataset all TRQs that were notified to the 
WTO during the 1995-2000-time period. The effects of TRQ administration on market 
access are addressed. We identify factors that impede market access and our results have 
implications for ways to reform agricultural TRQs.  
The following section provides our analytical framework.  The implementation of 
the URAA TRQs is briefly described, then the empirical model is developed, which is 
followed by a discussion of results and conclusions.   
The Analytical Framework 
 
A TRQ scheme contains three trade instruments, including an in-quota tariff (T1), 
a specified quota (Q0), and an over-quota tariff (T2). Hence, a TRQ regime combines 
tariffs and a quota, which make it quite complex.    
Both tariffs and quotas limit imports and create wedges between world and 
domestic prices. However, the mechanisms through which these two policies influence 
imports differ. Figure 1 and Figure 2 show how these two policies function. Here, we 
assume that the importing country is small. In the case of free trade, the excess supply 
curve (ES) facing the importing country is a horizontal line at the world price (Pw). The 
equilibrium is determined by the intersection of the excess demand curve (ED) and the   5
excess supply curve. The domestic price is the same as the world price and imports equal 
M0.  
If an import tariff is imposed (Figure 1), the excess supply curve is shifted upward 
by the amount of tariff, and become ES’. The domestic price (Pd) is determined at the 
point where ED intersects ES’ and is higher than the world price by the tariff level t. 




If instead, an import quota is used to restrict trade (see Figure 2), then any import 
volume exceeding the quota is not allowed and thus the ES curve is no longer continuous. 
Instead, the ES’ is kinked with a vertical portion at the quota level (Q0). Quota rents (Pd -
Pw per unit) are generated from this instrument and these rents are not necessarily 
obtained by the government. Who gets the quota rents? Well that depends on how the 









Figure 1.  Imports with a Tariff 
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A TRQ displays both tariff-like and quota-like characteristics. Figure 3 shows 
how a TRQ works. For imports within quota, importers face the price Pw+T1 and for 
imports over quota the price is Pw+T2. Hence, the excess supply (ES) curve is a step 
function (PW+T1)ABC. Imports under TRQs are determined by the excess demand (ED) 
in the home country and excess supply (Pw+T1)ABC. In theory, a TRQ regime is less 
restrictive than a standard quota since imports over the quota level are allowed at a higher 
tariff rate. However, in principal, a TRQ becomes a traditional quota if the over-quota 
tariff rate is prohibitive under normal market conditions. Which policy element is 
effective under a TRQ depends on the relative positions of the excess demand and supply 
curves.    
When the domestic demand for imports is relatively small, for example ED1 in 
Figure 3, the 1
st-tier tariff, T1, becomes effective and the quota is redundant. Imports 





















If domestic demand for imports is higher, say at level ED2 in Figure 3, then the 
quota becomes binding. Imports equal the quota amount, M2. The tariff-inclusive price of 
imports is Pw+T1, but the domestic price is higher and is set where ED2 intersects the 
vertical line rising above M2. Therefore, quota rent is generated. In this case, the TRQ 
serves as a quota with the import price inflated by the in-quota tariff.  
If the domestic demand for imports is strong, say at ED3, then imports over the 
quota quantity may occur and the 2
nd-tier tariff becomes the effective instrument. Imports 
now equal M3 and the domestic price is Pw+T2. The difference between Pw+T2 and Pw+T1 
becomes the size of the unit quota rent for the volume of product imported up to the point 
where the quota is filled (i.e., M2) and charged a lower in-quota tariff rate T2. 
A simple descriptive statistic, the TRQ fill rate, is often constructed to assess the 
performance of TRQs relative to market access goals. The fill rate is defined as the actual 
import volume over the scheduled quota volume (i.e., Q0 in Figure 3). It is determined by 
both actual imports and notified import quantities.  
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Figure 3.  Imports under TRQs   8
 In the pure-tariff situation, fill rates range from 0 to less than 1, i.e., [0, 1). In this 
case, the TRQ is said to be under-filled with a fill rate (M1/Q0) less than 1, and a portion 
of the quota is not utilized.  A zero fill rate indicates domestic demand is very low and 
domestic market conditions do not permit imports at the current in-quota tariff level. If 
the TRQ becomes a pure quota, i.e., the excess demand curve falls between ED4 and ED5 
in Figure 3, then the quota fill rate will be 1 as the quota is completely filled. If the 
second tier tariff becomes effective, then the fill rate (M3/Q0) is greater than 1, and the 
TRQ is overfilled.  The WTO does not require that TRQs be filled, and under-fill does 
not necessarily imply economic inefficiency, because under-fill may be due to 
insufficient domestic demand or exogenous market conditions.  
As long as arbitrage is profitable, imports will occur under TRQs. Obviously, the 
world price (Pw), the two tariff levels (T1 and T2), and the quota level (Q0) influence the 
volume of final imports and the fill rate. Moreover, other factors that directly affect 
excess demand and excess supply also affect the import volume and fill rate.  
  Administrative methods can influence TRQ fill rates. Although TRQs are not 
considered quantitative restrictions, they clearly contain a quota element. Hence, 
allocating import quota is necessary under a TRQ regime and some form of 
administrative method is needed. Therefore, TRQ administration fundamentally is a 
rationing problem, determining how import rights are distributed. Some administrative 
methods can increase transactions and import costs, and lead to low import volumes and 
low fill rates. Therefore, TRQ administrative methods have been a focus of discussion 
since the URAA.    9
The administration of TRQs involves different costs (Anderson). The first is the 
cost of rent seeking. If government intervention and regulation creates economic rent, 
firms and individuals will use resources to compete for a share of the rents. Rent seeking 
costs are wasted in the sense that these resources are not used in a productive fashion 
(Vousden). Rent seeking can take many different forms, like lobbying government 
officials, bribery, or overinvestment in physical plant to qualify for import licenses.  
Second, administrative costs may be high. The government can intentionally 
make the quota application process complex. Third, the administrators can influence 
import costs such as transportation. For instance, it is possible for the government to 
allocate quotas in a size that is not commercially feasible.   
Finally, administrative methods may allocate TRQs to high cost foreign producers 
and thereafter cause inefficiency. These suppliers would not be competitive under normal 
commercial conditions, but they are chosen for political reasons. For example, Japan’s 
rice TRQs are allocated in a non-commercial fashion.  
All of the above costs can be depicted in Figure 3 as an upward shift of ES or a 
leftward shift of ED. The magnitude of the shift of these curves determines how much 
imports are reduced and how the fill rate is affected. If the transactions costs are really 
high, it could even change the binding instrument. For instance, if ED3 in Figure 3 shifts 
to ED1, the quota will no longer be effective, and the 1
st-tier tariff will instead become 
binding. As a result, the quota will become under-filled.   
Ten principle TRQ administrative methods have been identified by the WTO: 
applied tariffs (AT), license on demand (LD), first-come first-served (FC), historical 
importers (HI), auctions (AU), state trading (ST), producer groups (PG), mixed allocation   10
(MX), other (OT), and non-specified (NS). These alternative administrative methods can 
be theoretically ranked in terms of the inherent risk of biasing trade and underfilling the 
quota and they can be classified into three categories (Skully).  
The first group, the “market allocation method”, including auctions and applied 
tariffs, is inherently superior. The second group, “quasi-market methods”, includes FC, 
license on demand, and historical allocation. These methods add random elements to the 
market allocation process. As a result, less efficient foreign suppliers have opportunities 
to gain a share of the market with these methods. The uncertainty and transactions costs 
introduced by these allocation methods can inhibit imports and increase the probability of 
underfill. The third group is termed “discretionary” and includes STEs and producer 
group methods. These methods could introduce market power and significantly distort 
trade. Hence, they are the least efficient. Some methods may be more preferable than 
others, and our empirical analysis will help measure how these methods affect market 
access opportunities.  
Additional conditions attached to TRQs also potentially bias trade and affect fill 
rates (WTO, 2001). These include domestic purchase requirements (DPR), limits on TRQ 
shares per allocation (LA), export certificates (EC), past trading performance (PT), and a 
combination of the above conditions. These additional conditions impact the eligibility of 
entities that can participate in the market and often give rise to economic inefficiency.  
Overview of TRQs 
Following the URAA, 33 WTO members established a total of 1,259 agricultural 
TRQs. Eight years later, by 2002, the total number of agricultural TRQs increased to 
1,425 and the number of countries employing TRQs increased to 43.     11
Although the WTO requires member countries to report details regarding the 
implementation of TRQs, not all countries fully comply. For example, Poland only 
notified 17 TRQs out of the 109 scheduled, and Costa Rica reported 8 out of its 27 TRQs. 
Additional reasons why TRQs go unnotified are because they are not open during the 
entire year or some TRQs are aggregated with others. For instance, the US does not 
report those TRQs reserved for Mexico under NAFTA. Our study includes TRQs 
employed by 28 countries who were members of the WTO prior to 1995.
1 
The number of TRQs in each member country differs significantly. Some 
countries use TRQs intensively. For example, Norway registers the highest number of 
TRQs with 232, accounting for 18% of the total number of agricultural TRQs. Poland 
comes in as second with 109 scheduled TRQs. In contrast, Australia, Brazil, and 
Indonesia only schedule and notify 2 TRQs each per year.     
Agricultural TRQs are typically subject to high tariff protection (Table 1). The 
average in-quota tariff for the TRQs covered in this study was about 90.5% from 1995 to 
2000. The standard deviation of the in-quota tariff was very high, about 359%, indicating 
a huge variation among countries. For instance, New Zealand did not apply any tariffs to 
its TRQs. The in-quota tariffs for Australia, Canada, and United States were relatively 
low, typically below 10%. On the other hand, Norway’s average in-quota tariff reached 
314% and Morocco’s specified in-quota tariffs were 117%, on average.  
The over-quota tariffs were substantially higher than in-quota tariffs, with an 
average tariff of 160%, and a standard deviation of 459%. Thirteen out of twenty-eight  
                                                 
1 There are five additional countries with scheduled TRQs from 1995, but they are not included in this 
study. El Salvador and Nicaragua did not notify any TRQs to the WTO because these two countries did not 
open quotas for any of the scheduled products. Malaysia, Mexico and Romania only notified a few of their 
scheduled TRQs in some years. Hence, these three countries were also dropped from this study. All 
members who joined the WTO after 1995 are excluded from this study.        12
Table 1: Average In- and Over-quota Tariffs of TRQs (1995-2000)     
Country  In-Quota Tariff (%)  Over-Quota Tariff (%) 
  Mean Sd Mean    Sd 
Australia 1.03  1.09  15.14  15.98     
Barbados  32.30 12.10  32.30 12.10     
Brazil  11.50  1.57  11.50  1.57   
Canada 9.43  6.11  214.63  122.17     
Colombia  73.41 64.80  92.80 89.47     
Costa Rica  55.00  0.00  152.11  71.39   
Czech Republic  29.17  17.81 70.09  36.28     
European  Commission  12.83 24.39  106.63 92.70     
Guatemala  18.48 11.21  55.01 70.80     
Hungary  26.22 14.75  60.66 23.95     
Iceland 17.40  20.38  57.77  139.33     
Indonesia  57.08 36.34  151.58 89.86     
Israel  90.92 77.52  119.32 62.42     
Japan 18.61  11.61  414.44  559.55     
Korea 20.05  16.95  311.76  256.89     
Morocco  117.09 46.54  190.50 86.09     
New Zealand  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00   
Norway  314.24 723.40  329.69 722.06     
Philippines  34.73 14.02  65.26 34.00     
Poland  39.50 22.86  129.13 72.14     
Slovak  Republic  29.38 17.13  71.37 36.49     
Slovenia  29.09 26.31  93.15 67.17     
South Africa  11.65  9.28  55.72  81.01   
Switzerland  42.79  75.84  350.05  1562.60   
Thailand  28.29 11.97  105.79 65.99     
Tunisia 26.26  9.46  131.19  63.79     
United States  8.00  5.60  71.11  52.46   
Venezuela 17.61  6.53  21.96  23.03   
Average  90.52    358.85  159.98    458.83 
Source: Compiled from AMAD. 
countries charged over-quota tariffs that exceeded 100% during the 1995-2000-time 
period. For example, the average over-quota tariff in Japan was 414%.  
In some countries, the over-quota tariff was only slightly higher than the in-quota 
tariff. However, in other cases the over-quota tariff was much higher than the in-quota 
tariff. For example, the average in-quota tariff in Canada was only 9.4%, while the over-
quota imports were subject to an average tariff rate of 214.6%. In Japan, the average 
over-quota tariff was 22 times the average in-quota tariff, with the in-quota and over-
quota tariffs at 18.6% and 414.4%, respectively.    13
Tariff protection afforded by TRQs is quite diverse across product groups (Figure 
4). Agricultural fibers are least protected by TRQs, with the average in-quota tariff of 
8.4%. The in-quota tariff rates for tobacco, oilseed products, sugar, coffee, tea and spices 
are all below 50%. On the other hand, “other” agricultural products, fruits and vegetables, 
meat, and cereal crops all enjoy a protection level of more than 100%, even for in-quota 
imports. Tobacco has the lowest over-quota tariff with the tariff level of 56%. Meat 
products and other agricultural products have the highest over-quota average tariff of 
more than 200%.     
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Source: Complied from AMAD
Average Base Tariff by Product Groups, 2000
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Note: BV=Beverages, CE=Cereals, CO=Coffee, tea, spices, & their products, DA=Fairy products,  
  EG=Eggs and products, FI = Agricultural fibers, FV=Fruit & vegetables, ME=Meat products,  
 OA=other agricultural products,  OI=Oilseeds products, TB = Tobacco, SG=Sugar & products.  
 
Among the ten principal administrative methods, applied tariffs (AT) is the most 
heavily employed and accounts for almost 50% of all TRQs (Table 2). Limited demand 
(LD) serves as the second most popular method, accounting for about a quarter of the   14
TRQs. Producer group (PG) and “other” methods (OT) are seldom used, with only 8 
TRQs regulated by PG in 1995 and 6 TRQs regulated by OT in 2000.   
Table 2: Distribution of Administrative Methods: Number of TRQs 
Administration  1995  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
AT  498  477 483 477 457 448 
AU  38  35 36 34 34 26 
FC  85  97 97 97 92 90 
HI  60  78 83 86 81 95 
LD  246  268 272 272 274 258 
MX  50  52 54 55 53 52 
OT  10  11  5 5 4 6 
PG  8  8 7 7 7 9 
ST  22  22 20 19 19 19 
Total  1,017  1,048 1,057 1,052 1,021 1,003 
Source: Compiled from AMAD. 
Note: AT = Applied tariffs, AU = Auctioning, FC = First come, first served,  
         HI = Historical importers, LD = Licenses on demand, MX = Mixed allocation methods,      
         OT = Other, PG=Producer groups, ST = Imports by state trading enterprises.   
During the 1995-2000 time period, the TRQ administrative methods have hardly 
changed. The use of applied tariffs decreased slightly from 1995 to 2000, dropping from 
498 TRQs in 1995 to 448 TRQs in 2000. In contrast, the use of historical allocation (HI) 
methods increased from 60 to 95, from 1995 to 2000.   
Some countries employ only one or two administrative methods. For example, all 
TRQs in Barbados are administered by AT. On the other hand, several countries regulate 
TRQs by a variety of methods. For instance, Canada uses 7 different methods to regulate 
its 21 TRQs. 
All TRQs in Barbados, Brazil, Guatemala, New Zealand, Tunisia, and Venezuela 
are implemented by AT. The majority of TRQs in Iceland and in Norway are also 
regulated by AT. Costa Rica employs an auction system to administer its TRQs, while the 
Czech Republic and Morocco report all of their TRQs under the FC category. On the 
other hand, the TRQs in Hungary, Slovak Republic and Slovenia are dominated by the   15
LD method. If we turn to the two giants in international agricultural trade, LD and HI 
account for about 84% of total EU TRQs, while 65% of the US TRQs are administered 
by FC.   
Four additional administrative methods and the combination of them are 
identified by the WTO. These additional requirements are applied to about 23% of the 
total TRQs. Among these four methods, “limits on tariff quota shares per allocation” is 
most intensively used, accounting for about one-half of the TRQs with additional 
requirements. Domestic purchase requirements and past trading performance 
requirements, respectively, account for another 20% of TRQs.  
Only sixteen countries report the use of “additional conditions” in addition to the 
principal administrative methods. The additional requirements are mostly employed with 
the LD method. About 70% of the TRQs administered by LD requires additional 
methods, while other principal methods, including AT, FC, HI, OT, and PG, do not 
involve additional methods.   
The average TRQ fill rate fell below 70% in each year from 1995 to 2000.
2 Figure 
5 shows the distribution of fill rates in 1995. About 53% of the TRQs had fill rates that 
were higher than 0.9 and the fill rates associated with about 18% of the TRQs were below 
0.1. The relatively low average fill rate, together with a large number of unfilled TRQs 
reveals that agricultural TRQs are under-utilized by a significant margin. This suggests 





                                                 
2 In order to provide consistency across countries, fill rates higher than 1 are censored to 1 in the following 
discussion.    16
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The fill rates of each administrative method show different patterns (Table 3). 
Although economically efficient, the fill rate for AU is the lowest among all methods. 
However, the fill rates for this method steadily increased over our sample period from 
27% to 44%, which suggests improved efficiency over time. With the second largest  
Table 3. TRQ Fill Rates across Principal Administrative Methods            
Regulation 1995  1996 1997 1998 1999  2000
AT 0.71  0.66 0.67 0.71 0.69  0.69
AU 0.27  0.30 0.34 0.40 0.40  0.44
FC 0.56  0.63 0.58 0.63 0.63  0.63
HI 0.91  0.73 0.73 0.68 0.69  0.70
LD 0.61  0.57 0.56 0.53 0.51  0.52
MX 0.72  0.78 0.70 0.70 0.70  0.68
NS   0.00  
OT 0.56  0.61 0.93 0.91 0.99  0.95
PG 0.74  0.53 0.85 0.78 0.69  0.75
ST 0.81  0.83 0.90 0.91 0.73  0.80
Average  0.67 0.64 0.63 0.65 0.63 0.64
Source: Compiled from AMAD. 
Note: AT = Applied tariffs, AU = Auctioning, FC = First come, first served,  
         HI = Historical importers, LD = Licenses on demand, MX = Mixed allocation methods,      
         OT = Other, PG=Producer groups, ST = Imports by state trading enterprises.      17
number of TRQs, LD also had fill rates lower than the average. Moreover, the fill rate for 
this method decreased slightly. On the other hand, PG and ST showed relatively high fill 
rates.  
The TRQ fill rates with PT and LA methods were significantly lower than the 
average fill rates (Table 4). On the other hand, the fill rates with DPR additional 
requirement were dramatically higher than the average fill rate. 
Table 4. TRQ Fill Rates across Additional Administrative Methods               
Additional  Methods  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
DPR  0.87 0.84 0.82 0.78 0.80 0.78 
DPR+LA      1.00  1.00 
PT  0.64 0.58 0.53 0.52 0.46 0.56 
LA  0.50 0.50 0.44 0.46 0.43 0.45 
EC  0.77 0.75 0.77 0.73 0.66 0.71 
EC+PT    0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.87 
Average  0.67 0.64 0.63 0.65 0.63 0.64 
Source: Compiled from AMAD. 
Note:   DPR = Domestic purchase requirement, EC = Exports certificates,   
LA = Limits on shares per allocation, PT = Past trading performance.      
The Empirical Model 
In this section, we specify an empirical model to assess the effects of TRQ 
implementation on market access and we measure those factors that affect TRQ fill rates. 
As noted previously, TRQ fill rate is the ratio of actual imports to the scheduled quota 
quantity. The notified quantities for a country are negotiated and predetermined before 
the implementation of TRQs. The only random component in the fill rate is actual 
imports. Hence, we start by modeling import behavior, i.e., focusing on a country’s 
excess demand for imports.   
If domestic prices deviate from the world price, arbitrage opportunities should 
exist and result in imports/exports. Hence, import demand, Y, is modeled as a function of   18
the domestic price, Pd, and the world price, Pw, and a vector of other exogenous demand 
shifters, X. 
dw Y=f ( P,P,X )                                                               (1)  
Three sets of variables are included in the other exogenous demand shifters, X. 
The first set of variables contains each country’s income and population. Three policy 
instruments, the 1
st-tier tariff and 2
nd-tier tariff, and quota volume, are the second set of 
demand shifters. The last set of demand shifters includes both principal and additional 
administration methods.  
Let’s define Yijt* as the hypothetical imports of commodity i in country j in year t 
and the other variables as in Table 5. Equation (1) can be rewritten as: 
ijt ijt ijt ijt jt jt
ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt
ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt it ijt
ijt
e Q Inc Pop
PT EC LA DPR MX OT PG
ST HI AU LD FC AT Pw Pd
e X Y
+ + + + + +
+ + + + + + +
+ + + + + + + + =
+ =
20 2 19 1 18 17 16
15 14 13 12 11 10 9
8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
* '
β τ β τ β β β
β β β β β β β
β β β β β β β β β
β
                 (2) 
There are several potential problems with the above specification (2). First of all, 
endogeneity problems arise. Because prices and import quantities are simultaneously 
determined, it is quite possible that some factors embodied in the error term are also 
related to price variables and this would lead to biased estimation results. Assuming the 
international market is perfectly competitive and every importing country is small, the 
world price can be treated as an exogenous variable. However, the domestic price is 
likely serially correlated with the error term. In order to deal with this problem, we use a 
one-period lagged production as the proxy for domestic price. Therefore, we can obtain a 
reduced-form model in which net imports is estimated directly as a function of world 
price, lagged domestic supply, current trade policies, and regulation methods.    19
Table 5: Regressors in the Import Equation 
 
Regressors   
Principle Administration Methods 
 
In the form of dummy variables  
AT  Applied tariffs 
FC  First-come, first-served 
LD  Licenses on demand 
AU  Auctioning 
HI  Historical importers 
ST  Imports by state trading enterprises 
PG  Producer groups/associations 
OT  Other 
MX  Mixed allocation methods 
Additional Conditions 
 
In the form of dummy variables 
DPR  Domestic purchase requirements 
LA  Limits on tariff quota shares 
EC  Export certificates 





st – tier tariffs 
τ2  2
nd – tier tariffs 




Pd  Domestic price, in terms of domestic currency 
Pw  World reference price, in domestic currency 
Inc  Income 
Pop  Population level 
c  Individual-specific effects 
e  Random error term 
Plag  One-time period lagged production 
 
Another possible specification problem with equation (2) is perfect 
multicollinearity. The principal administrative method enters the specification as a 
dummy variable. If all principal methods are included in the model, as in equation (2), 
then we fall into the dummy variable trap. To avoid perfect multicollinearity, we drop the 
“applied tariffs method” dummy. This administrative method does not impose   20
quantitative restrictions on imports and acts like a pure tariff and requires the least 
administrative effort. Therefore, this method is considered the most efficient way to 
administrative TRQs. Choosing this dummy as the benchmark also facilitates the 
interpretation of the results. The “additional administrative methods” also enter the 
specification in the form of dummy variables. However, these variables do not cause a 
multicollinearity problem since more than one-half of TRQs are not subject to additional 
requirements.  
In addition, unobserved individual heterogeneity and measurement errors may 
cause another type of endogeneity problem. Errors of measurement are, without doubt, 
important in microeconomic data and the bias due to omitted heterogeneity may be 
important. When a panel data set is available, these problems could be controlled by 
including individual specific effects in the model (Matyas and Sevestre, 1992). Therefore, 
we add a set of individual specific effects in equation (2).  
Taking into account the above problems, we specify a new demand function. 
Because the variable we are most interested in is the TRQ fill rate, we define the TRQ fill 
rate, yijt
*, as: 








ijt =  
Dividing both sides of equation (2) by the predetermined quota quantity, we have 
the following specification of TRQ fill rates, in which the quota quantity drops off from 
right hand side,    21
ijt ij ijt ijt jt jt
ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt
ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt ijt jit ijt
ijt
e c Inc Pop
PT EC LA DPR MX OT PG
ST HI AU LD FC AT Pw Plag
e c X y
+ + + + + +
+ + + + + + +
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τ β τ β β β
β β β β β β β
β β β β β β β β β
β
              (3) 
However, the above model fails to capture a distinguishing feature of the TRQ 
trade regime. In the analytical framework, we see that the dependent variable, the TRQ 
fill rate, is left-censored at 0 because no imports occur for some TRQs during some years. 
In the empirical analysis, the dependent variable is also right censored. First, the quota is 
binding for some TRQs with fill rates of 1. In addition, several countries only report 
imports under TRQs up to the quota level and over-quota imports are not reported. In 
order to be consistent, fill rates greater than 1 are censored to 1. Hence, TRQs are right-
censored at 1. A linear specification such as equation (3) is then inappropriate. In order to 
account for this characteristic, we specify a double-censored Tobit model, as suggested 
by Maddala (1983).  
Given the censored nature of the data, the TRQ fill rate, yijt
*, is a latent variable 
and is partially observed. What we can observe is a censored variable, yijt. For 
simplification, all of the subscripts of yijt
* and yijt are omitted in the following text. The 









y= y* if <y*<
if y*
                                                                       (4) 
The censored nature of the dependent variables causes us to further consider how 
individual-specific variables should be included in the model.  In general, individual-
specific variables can enter the model as either fixed effects or random effects. However, 
parametric estimators of limited dependent variable models with fixed effects from panel   22
data are inconsistent. This problem is most acute when the time dimension of the panel is 
low. Honore (1992) developed a nonparametric method, to obtain consistent estimates of 
a fixed-effect Tobit model in a short panel, the so called trimmed least absolute 
deviations and trimmed least squares estimators. However, this method cannot estimate 
variables that lack variation over time because the first differencing technique cancels out 
such variables. In most cases, principal and additional administrative methods do not 
change over time after they are first introduced. Therefore, this method cannot be applied 
to estimate the fill rate model. As a result, the individual specific variables, cij, enter the 
model as random effects and we make the following assumption, 
) , 0 ( ~
2
c ij N c σ  
 
Estimation and Results 
 
Our dataset covers the first six-year period of TRQ implementation, i.e., 1995 to 
2000, and every TRQ notified to the WTO is included.
3 The data on market access and 
TRQ trade regimes were mainly derived from the Agricultural Market Access Database 
(AMAD), updated on July 5, 2004. The AMAD is a cooperative effort among Agriculture 
and Agri-Food Canada, the EU Commission-Agriculture Director-General, FAO, OECD, 
the World Bank (WB), UNCTAD, and the United States Department of Agriculture-
Economic Research Service (ERS).  The information on TRQs, including scheduled 
quota quantity, notified quantity imported under TRQs, relevant in-quota and out-of-
quota tariffs, and applied tariffs were mainly complied from this database. In the case of 
                                                 
3 The study covers the 1995-2000-time period mainly because of data availability. The implementation of 
TRQs after 2000 has not changed much for developed countries because no consensus has been reached 
about reforms of TRQs in the Doha round. Moreover, the implementation of TRQs in developing country 
has not changed much, either. Based on the available small sample data, the fill rates of TRQs were even 
lower in 2001 and 2002. The administrative methods remain much the same for most TRQs.        23
missing data, the original country’s notification files to the WTO were used to obtain 
relevant information. 
Data on the principal and additional TRQ administration methods were obtained 
from a Background Paper by the WTO Secretariat, Tariff Quota Administration Methods 
and Tariff Quota Fill (TN/AG/S/6, 22 March 2002). Other data, including population and 
national income were obtained from the 2004 World Development Indicators published 
by the World Bank. 
Two models, a pooled Tobit model and a random-effect Tobit model were 
estimated. The likelihood ratio test rejects the pooled Tobit model, and in favor of the 
random effects Tobit model. In order to fit the random effects Tobit model, the Gauss-
Hermite quadrature is used to compute the likelihood function.  The regression results are 
presented in Table 6. 
An examination of the random effects Tobit model result indicates that the world 
price negatively affects quota fill rates. This makes sense because higher world prices 
reduce import revenue and result in a lower volume of imports.  The one-period lagged 
production in the random effects Tobit model turns out to be positive, which seems 
counterintuitive. However, the impact of domestic production on market access is very 
marginal and the estimate is not statistically different from zero. This marginal effect may 
be caused by the weak linkage between the domestic and international market since other 
factors may play a stronger role in determining imports. It may also be a result of the 
aggregate production data. The production data from FAO sometimes is less disaggregate 
than trade data. Population growth increases the aggregate demand for agricultural   24
products and encourages more imports. The income level is statistically insignificant and 
does not affect imports much. 
Table 6. Regression Results for Fill Rate Models 
Pooled Tobit  Random Effects Tobit  Regressors 
Coefficient t-value Coefficient  t-value 
Pw 0.003  0.31  -0.021**  -3.46 
Plag  0.000 0.42 0.000  0.64 
GDP Per Capita  -0.001  -0.64  -0.001  -0.35 
Pop  0.001** 5.15 0.001**  7.72 
τ1  -0.096** -6.11 -0.054**  -3.47 
τ2  0.000** 4.92 0.000**  3.67 
AU  -1.018** -13.57 -0.717**  -9.45 
FC  -0.457** -9.27 -0.488**  -8.02 
HI  -0.419** -8.33 -0.383**  -7.84 
LD  -0.725** -15.33 -0.592**  -11.07 
MX  -0.536** -9.00 -0.354**  -5.18 
OT -0.045  -0.28  -0.399*  -2.46 
PG -0.409*  -2.85  -0.123  -1.35 
ST -0.269*  -2.89  -0.559**  -5.63 
DPR  0.767** 10.66 0.543**  7.05 
PT -0.108  -1.73  -0.128*  -2.04 
LA -0.008  -0.16  -0.145*  -2.55 
EC 0.261*  2.96  -0.225**  -2.75 
Constant  1.211** 40.95 1.141**  32.97 
σc  - -  0.694  34.43 
Log-Likelihood -4150.086    -2841.644   
Observations  4581  4581   
Note: * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
The estimate of the 1
st-tier tariff is negative at the 1% significance level. This type 
of protection reduces market access. On the other hand, the estimated coefficient for the 
2
nd-tier tariff is very small and not much different from zero. This result suggests that the 
2
nd-tier tariffs did not have much influence on quota fill rates during the study period, 
despite the high protection level offered by these tariffs. Therefore, negotiations focusing 
on general reductions of the over-quota tariff will not necessarily improve market access.   25
Considering the principal administrative methods, our regression results show that 
administration plays an important role in the performance of TRQs. All estimated 
coefficients are negative. Except for the producer group method, all coefficients for the 
administrative methods are statistically significant, indicating that all of these methods 
are inferior to the applied tariff method and they negatively impact imports. 
Our results show that the applied tariffs (AT) method is superior to other methods 
in the sense that it has the least negative effect on imports. Under this method, imports 
are allowed in unlimited quantities at the in-quota tariff rate, or below.  No shares are 
allocated to importers under this method. Hence, TRQs managed by the AT method are 
not real TRQs since there is no quantitative restriction. TRQs administered by this 
method are equivalent to simple tariffs.  
Theoretically efficient, auctioned import licenses lead to surprisingly low quota 
fill rates and we find that they have the most negative effect on market access. It is 
possible that the countries applying this method have introduced some additional 
distortions in the auction system. Skully (2001) found that this method outperforms other 
methods only when the market is sufficiently liquid, i.e., when the market has a large 
volume of trade and is competitive. 
First come, first served, license on demand, and historical importer methods 
allocate imports rights in different ways. However, they have similar estimated impacts 
on market access.   In the FC method, the physical importation of the good determines the 
applicable tariff.   This method places a premium on time. If the importer is caught as the 
one importing over quota, the importers have to either pay a higher tariff level, store the 
product outside the border, or trans-ship the product to another country. This method also   26
biases trade distribution because it gives an advantage to exporters who are 
geographically closer to the importers. All these reasons can lead to low market access 
for this method. 
In the licenses on demand (LC) method, licenses are issued among all applicants 
based on quantities requested in most cases. If the total volume of license requests 
exceeds the available quantity, then requests are reduced pro rata. This pro rata reduction 
brings inefficiencies and leads to potential quota underfill. First of all, importers have the 
incentive to exaggerate their quota requests, anticipating a reduction in the total licensed 
quantity. Furthermore, the overall reduction may lead to fragmented market shares so that 
importers then choose not to import small quantities. Hence, some quotas may not be 
filled. 
If the historical importers method is used, importers' shares are allocated to 
exporters principally based on past import performance. This method makes the existing 
exporters’ planning easier. However, it results in static trade shares. Once the quota is 
allocated to an exporter, the license tends to be valid for several years. The importing 
country has the power to control trade in the sense that they can choose the reference year 
to decide who obtains licenses. A historical importer may not even be a current supplier 
due to cost considerations. If these high-cost countries are granted a license, then quota 
under-fill is possible. 
Imports controlled by state trading entities (ST) is the least transparent way to 
administrate TRQs, because the state trader has the right to make import-sourcing 
decisions that may have nothing to do with commercial considerations. However, our 
regression results show that the degree to which these factors impede imports is   27
moderate. This result may be due to the fact that most of TRQs under this method are 
politically sensitive so that governments have an incentive to fill the quota. 
Although all principal administrative methods have negative impacts on TRQ fill 
rate, the magnitudes of the estimated coefficients differ. We tentatively rank the effects of 
each method on the fill rate, according to the size of the estimated coefficients. 
Surprisingly, the empirical ranking is different from the theoretical ranking. The two 
discretionary methods, PG & ST are not the methods that reduce fill rates the most. In 
contrast, PG has the least impact on fill rates other than AT, and ST has a medium 
influence on fill rates. On the other hand, auctioning (AU), the best method in theory, 
results in the lowest fill rates among all principal methods.        
Table 7. Rank of the Impacts on Fill Rates across Administrative Methods 
 

























Note: 1. AT = Applied tariffs, AU = Auctioning, FC = First come, first served,  
HI = Historical importers, LD = Licenses on demand, PG=Producer groups,  
ST = Imports by state trading enterprises.    
2. MX( = Mixed allocation method) and  OT( = Other) are not ranked because they     
   combine several methods and therefore are difficult to rank them theoretically.  
It is not surprising that the three additional administrative requirements, limits on 
TRQ shares per allocation (LA), export certificates (EC), and past trading performance 
(PT), are negatively related to quota fill rates. However, our results indicate that the DPR 
condition increases imports, which is a bit puzzling. This additional condition requires   28
the purchase or absorption of domestic production of the product in order to be eligible 
for a share of the import quota. This requirement obviously increases the costs for some 
importing firms. However, firms are more likely to commit to import once they obtain 
their quota share because they are involved in the domestic business, and this results in 
higher fill rates. 
Conclusion 
We have conducted a comprehensive study of the impacts of agricultural TRQs 
on market access. A two-limit random effects Tobit model was specified to examine 
factors that affect TRQ fill rates. The empirical results provide insights as to how to 
further liberalize TRQs and improve market access for agricultural products.  
We find that the in-quota tariffs have provided strong protection. Further reducing 
in-quota tariffs will be much more effective in improving market access, compared to 
reducing the over-quota tariffs. However, this does not imply that the over-quota tariffs 
should be left untouched. It simply means that in the presence of the current in-quota 
tariffs and quota levels; the over-quota tariffs are not very relevant.  
Moreover, we have found that the choice of TRQ administrative method is very 
important because all administrative methods, including principal and additional 
methods, have the potential to reduce market access. We find that the empirical ranking 
of the fill rate impacts of alternative administrative methods deviates from the theoretical 
ranking. The applied tariff method is found to be superior to other methods, which 
emphasizes the importance of increasing the transparency of administrative methods. 
Trade negotiations devoted to making TRQ administration simpler and more transparent 
will surely improve market access.  The sooner the transitional TRQ regime is phased out   29
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